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Abstract
This paper highlights the role of the terms of trade in the trade chan-
nel of propagation of oil price shocks both empirically and theoretically.
Empirically, I show that oil price shocks have a large, persistent and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant impact on the US terms of trade. Theoretically, I add
oil in the model by Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) and analyse under what
conditions the terms of trade plays a relevant role in the international
transmission of oil price shocks. With nominal price rigidities and full ex-
change rate pass-through positive oil price shocks depreciate the currency
of the oil importing country. The subsequent negative wealth eﬀect adds
to the recessive eﬀect of the supply channel and may strongly reduce the
consumption in the oil importing country economy. Without exchange
rate pass-through oil shocks transmit to the economy only through the
supply channel. The model suggests that a change in the exchange rate
pass-through might contribute to explain the evidence of a weaker impact
of oil price shocks on the macroeconomic activity in recent times.
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11 Introduction
The oil literature has a hard time to match the evidence of a negative correla-
tion between the macroeconomic performance of oil-importing countries and oil
price shocks with empirically sound theoretical mechanisms of propagation of oil
price shocks. The empirical literature has provided quantitative measures of the
impact of oil price shocks on macroeconomic variables such as the growth rate
of GDP and the inﬂation rate (see, i.e., Hamilton 1983, Leduc and Sill 2004),
employment (see, i.e., Lee and Ni 2002, Davis 1987), the stock market (Kilian
and Park 2009), the terms of trade (Backus and Crucini 2000) and external
balances (see, i.e., Kilian et al 2009). The theoretical literature, in an attempt
to explain this evidence has investigated both demand and supply mechanisms
of propagation of oil shocks to the economic activity.1
Recent contributions of the literature have stressed that the demand chan-
nels, which operate through a reduction of the demand for goods and services
other than oil, are the key to explain the impact of oil price shocks to macroeco-
nomic performance (Nordhaus 2007, Hamilton 2008, Kilian 2008). This paper
follows this direction and focuses on the trade channel of transmission of oil
price shocks, which emphasizes the role of changes in the relative prices and
quantities of imports and exports in the propagation of oil price shocks to the
economy. In particular, as the dollar share of oil imports in total imports is
far larger and volatile than the dollar share of oil expenditures in total output,
data point out the potential relevance of the terms of trade in the mechanism
of adjustment to oil price shocks.2
Firstly, I provide empirical evidence that oil price shocks cause large varia-
tions in the terms of trade of the US, the most important oil-importing country.
To this purpose, I follow the methodology suggested by Kilian and Vigfusson
(2009) that allows me to obtain consistent estimates of the response of the terms
of trade to oil price shocks independently of the presence of asymmetric eﬀects
of oil price increases and decreases (see, i.e., Mork 1989, Hooker 2002, Kilian
and Vigfusson 2009). My main result is that a positive oil price shock has a
large, persistent and statistically signiﬁcant impact on the US terms of trade. I
also report limited evidence of asymmetric eﬀects of oil price shocks on the US
terms of trade by mean of an impulse-response based test of symmetry. Finally,
I show that the response of the terms of trade to oil price shocks increases more
than proportionally with the size of the shock.
1The literature on the supply and demand mechanisms of propagation of oil shocks to the
economy is far too vast to be surveyed here. Some of the seminal papers are Hamilton 1988
and 2008, Bernanke 1983, Davis 1987, Davis and Haltwanger 2001, Bresnahan and Ramey
1993, Bernanke et al 1996, Hamilton and Herrera 2004, Kim and Loungani 1992, Rotemberg
and Woodford 1996, Atkenson and Kehoe 1999 and Finn 2000.
2Complementary to the trade channel there is another international channel of adjustment
to oil price shocks: the ﬁnancial or valuation eﬀect. The valuation channel works through
changes in the total asset returns diﬀerentials. On the role of the valuation eﬀect in the
external adjustment of economies see Ghironi et al. (2007), Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2007),
Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Deveraux and Sutherland (2008).
2Secondly, I analyse the theoretical conditions that permit positive oil price
shocks to produce, through the trade channel, a large negative impact on the
economy of oil importing countries. To this purpose, I add oil in the production
to the two-country general equilibrium model by Corsetti and Pesenti (2005)
and use it to analyse the international transmission of oil price shocks under
diﬀerent price regimes and ﬁnancial autarky. With respect to early (see, i.e.,
Fried and Schulze 1975, Dohner 1981 and Bruno and Sachs 1985) and recent
(see, i.e., Bodenstein et al 2007, Backus and Crucini 2000) theoretical analysis of
the trade channel of adjustment to oil shocks my contributions are the following.
The model highlights the role of the degree of exchange rate pass-through in the
propagation mechanism of oil price shocks. A positive oil price shock produces
a trade imbalance that, with nominal price rigidities and full exchange rate
pass-through, forces the currency of the oil importing country to depreciate to
restore the balance. As a consequence of the depreciation, the oil importing
country suﬀers a negative wealth eﬀect and the oil exporting country a positive
wealth eﬀect, so that the terms of trade redistributes asymmetrically the cost of
adjustments to positive oil price shocks in favor of the oil exporting country. This
transmission mechanism makes it possible for a positive oil price shock to cause
to the oil importing country an economic cost that, in terms of consumption loss,
is larger than the share of oil costs in total output (supply channel). However,
with nominal price rigidities but no exchange rate pass-through, the adjustment
mechanism to an oil price shock changes. As export prices grow insensitive to
the exchange rate the strenght of the trade channel gets weaker, up to the point
in which oil shocks are transmitted to the economy only through the supply
channel. A ﬁnal contribution of the model is to show that the elasticity of most
economic variables to oil price shocks is not constant but increases with the size
of the shock.
The model suggests that a change in the exchange rate pass-through might
contribute to explain the evidence of a weaker impact of oil price shocks on the
economic activity in recent times (Hooker 1996 and 2002, Hamilton 1996, Balke
et al. 2002, and Blanchard and Galì 2007). In fact, as the degree of exchange
rate pass-through also depends on the proportion of ﬁrms that serve foreign
markets by producing locally (i.e. by foreign direct investments) rather than
exporting, the ﬁrms’ choice of how serving foreign markets may play a role in
shaping the strength of the trade channel. From these results it follows that
countries more dependent on oil-imports will not necessarily suﬀer the most in
the aftermath of a surge in the price of oil (see, i.e., Bohi 1999).
Section 2 presents evidence and the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes
the theoretical model and presents results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
The top panel of Figure 1 shows the dynamic of the dollar share of US oil
imports in total imports during 1973M1-2010M5 (source OECD). On average,
3oil imports have represented 16% of all US imports in the period, though this
ﬁgure has not been constant over time: it averaged 25% in the 70s, bottomed
around 10% in the mid 80s and through all the 90s, and then rose again to
15% in the 2000s. The bottom panel of ﬁgure 1 reports the dynamic of the
real price of oil over the same period. The price of oil is the US crude oil
imported acquisition cost by reﬁners in dollar per barrel (source EIA) and the
price deﬂator is the US CPI (source IFS). In both panels the grey-shaded areas
highlight episodes of large and fast variations in the price of oil, mostly related
to political events aﬀecting the oil supply.
Two facts emerge from ﬁgure 1: oil imports both are a relevant share of
US total imports and follow a dynamic similar to that of the real price of oil.
Consequently, it i sreasonable to assume that large variations in the price of oil,
by changin the US import price index, also aﬀect its terms of trade, that is the
ratio between the US export price index and the US import price index.
Figure 1 - Oil imports (% of total imports) and the real price of oil in the US.
The terms of trade is the key variable of the trade channel of propagation of
oil shocks to the economy. A change in the terms of trade aﬀects the level and
the composition of both the aggregate demand and the trade balance, though
its ﬁnal eﬀect on them depends ultimately on factors such as the elasticity of
substitution between imports and exports and the degree to which the interna-
tional ﬁnancial markets are integrated. The elasticity of substitution between
4imports and exports dictates by how much a country, after a worsening in its
terms of trade, will switch from imported to domestically produced goods. The
degree to which the international ﬁnancial markets are integrated aﬀects the
response of the trade balance to a change in the terms of trade, as the trade
balance is unaﬀacted by movements in the terms of trade in case of complete
markets, while the reaction is maximised in case of ﬁnancial autarky
Thus, I evaluate if a trade channel is at work after an oil price shock by
focusing on the relationship between the real price of oil and the terms of trade.3
2.1 Data and Methodology
The price of oil is the US crude oil imported acquisition cost by reﬁners (dollar
per barrel, source EIA). The price index is the CPI all items (index, base year
2005, source IFS). The terms of trade is constructed as the ratio between the
US export price index over the US import price index (index number, base year
2005, source IFS). Data are monthly and cover the period 1973:1-2010:5.
In analysing the impact of oil shocks on the terms of trade I assume that
the real price of oil is predetermined to the terms of trade.4 This assumption
amounts to imply no contemporaneous impact of terms of trade innovations on
the real price of oil, and is regarded as plausible as long as the data frequency
are either monthly or quarterly. The use of oil price is sometimes criticised on
the ground that this measure does not distinguish among diﬀerent sources of
oil shocks, such as oil supply shocks, speciﬁc oil-demand shocks and aggregate
demand shock in the industrial commodity market (Kilian 2009). In spite of
this shortcoming, its use in the present analysis has two justiﬁcations. First,
it is always possible to use the price of oil as long as the interest is on the
average oil price innovation and not on speciﬁc episodes. Second, as the focus
of the analysis is on the terms of trade, it is reasonable to assume that oil price
shocks both supply and demand driven would produce a similar eﬀect on the
terms of trade (in this respect, in Kilian et al 2009 the external adjustment to oil
shocks results qualitatively and quantitatively similar to both oil demand and oil
supply shocks). In case the source of the oil price shock is the aggregate demand
in the industrial commodity market, both the numerator and the denominator
of the terms of trade would be aﬀected, so that in theory the terms of trade
might go either direction. However, as the role of commodities in US exports is
quantitatively limited with respect to the role of oil in US imports, it is plausible
to assume that even in presence of a shock to the aggregate demand in the
industrial commodities it would be the dynamic of the price of oil to determine
the direction of the change in the terms of trade. I also follow Nordhaus (2007)
3For an empirical analysis on the external adjustment to oil shocks see Kilian et al. (2009).
4The empirical literature has largely debated over both the nature and the identiﬁcation of
oil shocks (see, i.e., Lee et al 1995, Hamilton 1983 and 2003, Barsky and Kilian 2004, Kilian
and Vigfusson 2009 and Kilian 2009).
5and scale the price of oil for its economic importance, which in this context is
represented by the share of oil imports in total imports.
In the econometric analysis I allow for increases and decreases in the price
of oil to have diﬀerent impacts on the terms of trade. Empirical evidence of
asymmetric eﬀects of oil price shocks on economic variables dates back to Mork
(1989) and Olsen and Mysen (1994), and led to rejecting a linear relationship
between oil prices and real activity, arguing that only positive oil price innova-
tions would aﬀect the macroeconomic performance (Mork 1989, Lee et al. 1996,
Hamilton 1996). However, Kilian and Vigfusson (2009) challenge this result on
the ground that it is based on standard censored VAR regression models that
produce biased estimations (see also Rigoboni and Stoker 2007). As an alterna-
tive, they propose a diﬀerent methodology to both control for the asymmetry
of oil price shocks and to test it. More speciﬁcally, they propose to estimate
a bivariate nonlinear structural model and test for symmetry by mean of an
impulse-response based test. The structural nonlinear bivariate model is the
following:
xt = b10 + B11(L)xt−1 + B12(L)yt−1 + ε1,t (1)
yt = b20 + B21(L)xt + B22(L)x+
t + B23(L)yt−1 + ε2,t ,
where xt is the logarithm of the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the real price of oil, x
+
t
captures only the positive values of xt, yt is the logarithm of the terms of
trade and the error terms, ε1,t and ε2,t are mutually uncorrelated error terms,
and (B11(L),B12(L)) and (B21(L),B22(L),B23(L)) are polynomial matrices of
coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst and second equation.
This model allows for a consistent estimation of the coeﬃcients and the
impulse responses regardless of whether the true data generation process of yt is
symmetric or asymmetric. Moreover, an equation-by-equation OLS estimation
applies as the errors are mutually uncorrelated by constructions. To compute
the impulse-response based test I follow Kilian and compute generalised impulse
responses, as nonlinear impulse responses require to take into account both the






and the variability of future shocks
{ε1,t,ε2,t} (see also Koop et al 1996 and Potter 2000).
2.2 Results
I estimate the model in (1) with 2 lags, as suggested by both the Akaike and
Hannan-Quinn information criteria. The impulse response analysis shows that
oil price shocks have a large, persistent and statistically signiﬁcant impact on
the US terms of trade. After a one-standard deviation positive oil price shock
(6.25%) the terms of trade starts depreciating, reaching the through after three
months (top panel of Figure), and then slowly goes back to zero. The response of
the terms of trade remains statistically signiﬁcant (95% conﬁdence interval) up
to two and half a year after the shock. The cumulated depreciation of the terms
of trade is around 14% 30 months after the shock (bottom panel of Figure 2).
6The large eﬀect of oil price shocks on the terms of trade suggests that the terms
of trade, and so the trade channel, plays an important role in the transmission
mechanism of oil shocks.
To test the presence of asymmetry in the response of the economy to posi-
tive and negative oil price shocks I follow Kiliand and Vigfusson (2009) and use
an impulse-response based symmetry test rather than a standard slope-based
symmetry test. The joint null hypothesis of the impulse-response based symme-
try test is that the response of the terms of trade to positive and negative oil
price shocks is symmetric up to the pre-speciﬁed horizon. Table 1 reports the
pre-speciﬁed horizon (row 1) and the corresponding p-value of the test statistics
under the null hypothesis of symmetry (row 2). The hypothesis of symmetry
is rejected at the 5% level at the ﬁrst two horizons, and at the 10% level at
the third horizon (similar results apply when considering a size of the shock of
two standard deviations). The test provides a weak support to the hypothesis
that oil price shocks might have asymmetric eﬀect on the economy through the
terms of trade.
Figure 2 - Impulse (top panel) and cumulated (bottom panel) impulse
response of the Terms of trade to a 1-standard deviation positive oil price
shock. The shaded areas are the 95% conﬁdence interval.
7Horizon 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
p-values 0,017 0,025 0,057 0,114 0,194 0,293 0,406 0,522 0,634 0,732 0,814 0,877
Based on 1000 simulations. P-values are based on a chi-square with H+1 d.f.
Table 1 - Impulse-Response based Symmetry test
Finally, I investigate whether the response of the terms of trade depends on
the size of the oil price shock. However, by rescaling the real price of oil by the
oil import share, a greater weight is given to those changes in the real price of
oil that occur when the price of oil is high. For oil changes of the same size to
be given the same weight in the dataset I have re-estimate model (1) without
scaling the real price of oil by the oil import share. Results are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar, but they add a further piece of evidence on the eﬀect of
oil price shocks on the terms of trade: the response of the terms of trade to an
oil price shock appear to increase with the size of the shock (Figure 3).
Figure 3 - The response of the Terms of trade to a Positive oil price shock by
shock size. All responses have been scaled by the size of the shocks to ensure
comparability.
3 Theoretical Analysis
This section presents a theoretical analysis of the trade channel of adjustment
to oil price shocks and the role that the terms of trade plays in it. To this
8purpose, I strictly follow Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) and set up a simple two-
country general equilibrium model with imperfect competition in production
and incomplete international ﬁnancial markets. Oil is introduced in the model
as a factor of production and is traded from the oil-importing country to the oil-
exporting country at a price that is determined exogenously in the currency of
the home importing country.5 The transmission mechanism of oil price shocks
to the economy is then analysed under three diﬀerent price regimes: ﬂexible
prices, nominal price rigidity with producer currency pricing (PCP) regime and
nominal price rigidities with local currency pricing (LCP) regime.
In the next section I report the main elements of the model and present
results. For technical details on how to derive the general equilibrium condi-
tions of the model refer to appendix A. The ﬂexible price equilibrium is derived
analytically in appendix B. The equilibrium with nominal price rigidities and
Producer Currency Pricing regime is derived in appendix C. The equilibrium
with nominal price rigidities and Local Currency Pricing is derived analytically
in appendix D.
3.1 The Model
The world consists of two countries of equal size, Home and Foreign, which are
identical in any respect apart from three aspects: total factor productivity, mon-
etary policy and oil endowment. In particular, oil is a Foreign speciﬁc resource,
so that Home is the oil importing country and Foreign is the oil exporting coun-
try. Each country is inhabited by a continuum of households and ﬁrms: in the
Home country households are indexed by i ∈ [0,1] and ﬁrms are indexed by h
∈ [0,1]; in the Foreign country households are indexed by i∗ ∈ [0,1] and ﬁrms
are indexed by f ∈ [0,1]. In what follows I focus on the Home economy since
the Foreign economy can be described symmetrically.
Households Households cannot move across countries, share identical pref-
erences, own domestic ﬁrms, derive utility from a ﬁnal consumption good and
disutility from supplying labor services to ﬁrms in exchange for wage income.
The utility of household i at a given period t is given by:
Ut(i) = lnCt(i) − kLt(i).
The parameter k > 0 determines the disutility of supplying labor and Ct,
the ﬁnal consumption good, is not traded internationally and is produced in a
perfectly competitive ﬁnal good sector by a Cobb Douglas aggregator technology









5This last assumption aims to mimic the fact that while the price of oil is set in US dollar,
the US is an oil-importing country.



























the parameter θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties, is equal
across countries and is higher than the elasticity of substitution between CH
and CF that is 1 as Ct is a Cobb Douglas aggregator.
Solving for the expenditure minimization problem I obtain both the price
level (Pt) and the households’ demand for a speciﬁc variety h (Ct(h,i)) and a





































where PH,t and PF,t are the price indices of, respectively, CH,t and CF,t.
At any period t households face the following budget constraint:
PtCt(i) + Bt(i) + εtB∗





where PtCt(i) is nominal spending on the ﬁnal consumption good, Wt is the
nominal wage per unit of labor, Πt(i) is household’s share of proﬁt of ﬁrms in
the intermediate goods sector. Households can purchase two riskless one-period
bonds at any period t: Bt(i), which is denominated in home currency and yields
a nominal interest it at t + 1, and B∗
t(i), which is denominated in foreign-
currency and yields a nominal interest rate i∗
t at t + 1. The nominal exchange
rate, εt, expresses how many units of Home currency are exchanged per one unit
of Foreign currency.








t ln(Ct(i)) − κLt(i),
subject to the stream of one-period budget constraints deﬁned in (2).
10Firms and pricing regimes The intermediate goods market is characterised
by monopolistic competition: each ﬁrm supplies a single variety h that is an
imperfect substitute to all other varieties. Technology is represented by a Cobb




Zt > 0 is the total factor productivity and is common across Home ﬁrms.
α ∈ (0,1) is the share of labor income and is common across ﬁrms and countries.
Lt(h) and Et(h) are, respectively, the amount of labor and oil that are employed
in the production of variety h at the period t. The aggregate demand of a variety


























Any ﬁrm sets two prices for its variety h, one in the Home market and the
















subject to the aggregate demand for its good (3). The marginal cost of h is:




Zαα(1−α)1−α, which is identical across varieties h.
The intermediate goods prices are computed under three diﬀerent scenarios,
each one characterised by either ﬂexible prices or nominal price rigidities, and
by the speciﬁc pricing regime that the intermediate goods ﬁrms adopt in the
two countries. To deﬁne what are the possible pricing regimes that a ﬁrm
can adopt let us consider that in general the Home ﬁrm, but the same line of
reasoning holds for the Foreign ﬁrm, maximizes its proﬁt in the Foreign market
by setting the price ˜ Pt(h) = P∗
t (h)ε
φ
t , where the parameter φ ∈ [0,1] is the
degree of exchange rate pass-through. If φ = 1 we are under the producer
currency pricing (PCP) regime: the price the ﬁrm sets in the Foreign market
is ˜ Pt(h) = P∗
t (h)εt and is denominated in Home currency, so that any change
in the nominal exchange rate fully transmits to ˜ Pt(h). If φ = 0 we are under
the local currency pricing (LCP) regime: the price the ﬁrm sets in the Foreign
market is ˜ Pt(h) = P∗
t (h) and is denominated in Foreign currency, so that no
change in the nominal exchange rate aﬀects ˜ Pt(h). An interesting way to see
11at the diﬀerent degree of exchange rate pass-through involved by the two price
regimes is to interpret it in terms of the geographical distribution of the ﬁrm’s
production sites. Let us consider again the case of an Home ﬁrm that produces
h and let us assume that it always sets the price in the producer currency, but
now it can choose how to distribute its production between the two countries.
It follows that the inﬂuence of the exchange rate regime on the price set in
the Foreign market will depend on how the total production of h is distributed
between Home and Foreign. Full exchange pass-through would correspond to
the case in which h is entirely produced at Home, while the case of no exchange
pass-through would occur when the production of h has been divided across the
two countries as to serve both markets as a local ﬁrm.
Under a ﬂexible price regime the choice of the invoice currency for the price
of exports does not have any eﬀect on the propagation mechanism of oil price
shocks, that is both the PCP and the LCP regime lead to the same result.
However, when nominal rigidities are introduced, which one of the two regimes
is on has a large eﬀect on the way oil price shocks transmit to the economy.
Monetary Policy The monetary policy stance is deﬁned by  t = PtCt. This
speciﬁcation of the monetary policy allows the monetary authority to inﬂuence
the aggregate nominal spending without specifying what is the exact instrument
that it uses to do it.
The price of oil The nominal price of oil is exogenous 6, is denominated in






Financial allocations in equilibrium A symmetric equilibrium is com-
puted under the assumption of ﬁnancial autarky, so that the agents cannot lend
or borrow internationally.
3.1.1 The ﬂexible price regime
The distinction between an oil importing and oil exporting country is the third
source of cross-country asymmetry in the model equilibrium other than diﬀer-
ences across countries in the total factor productivity and the monetary policy





θ−1 + (1 − α)
θ
θ−1 − (1 − α)
 
> 1. (5)
6Though an oil market is not explicitly modelled, the assumption of an exogenus price of
oil amounts to considering a perfectly elastic oil supply (any quantity of oil demanded can
be supplied at the given price) and zero marginal costs. The price of oil is then determined
entirely by a speciﬁc tax that is set up by the government of the Foreign country, and whose
revenues are equally redistributed across households as a lump sum transfer.
12which is an increasing function of both the degree of monopolistic power in
the Home intermediate goods sector (θ) and its share of oil costs (1 − α):
The presence of ϕFLP causes the oil importing currency to depreciate in
equilibrium with respect to the case of no oil in the economy (as in Corsetti and
Pesenti where ϕFLP = 1):




The parameter ϕFLP approaches 1 as both (1 − α) goes to 0 (no oil is
required to produce) and as θ approaches 1, as a larger monopolistic power
implies both a lower equilibrium production, which requires fewer oil imports,











, so that in equilibrium Foreign households




= ϕFLP =⇒ C∗




= ϕFLP =⇒ L∗
t < Lt.
To describe the impact of oil price shocks on a variable of interest Yt I
compute its elasticity to the price of oil. For this purpose, I deﬁne by χYt,Pe,t the
elasticity of the variable Yt to the price of oil, that is the percent change in Yt
when the price of oil Pe,t increases by one percent. The impact of oil price
shocks on the world economy with ﬂexible prices is then summed up by the
following elasticities:
χεt,Pe,t = 0 (7)
χCt,Pe,t = χ∗
Ct,Pe,t = −(1 − α) (8)
χPt,Pe,t = χ∗
Pt,Pe,t = (1 − α) (9)
χLt,Pe,t = χ∗
Lt,Pe,t = 0 (10)
For example, with ﬂexible prices a positive oil price shock does not aﬀect
either the nominal exchange rate (7) or the level of employment in the two
countries (10) 7, while, in both countries, the price level increases (9) and con-
sumption decreases (8) by the same amount. 8
Figure 4 shows the eﬀect of a positive oil price shock on the Aggregate Supply
(AS) and the Aggregate Demand (AD) schedules of the Home economy in the
space (C,L) :
7The increase in the demand of labor that is due to the substitution of labor for oil cancels
out the decrease in the demand of labor that is caused by a lower aggregate demand.
8It is worth noting that in case of shocks to the real price of oil rather than to the nominal




distinction may matter when trying to estimate the eﬀect of oil price shocks to the economy
in empirical works, though the diﬀerence between both measures is negligible if the oil share
is small.
13AS : Ct = τFLPLt































Figure 4 - The eﬀect of a positive oil price shock on the economy when prices
are ﬂexible.
The index τFLP in the AS schedule captures both the supply channel (the
condition of intratemporal marginal substitution between labor and energy) and
the trade channel of transmission of oil price shocks. However, with identical
technology across countries and no change in the nominal exchange rate, oil
price shocks do not change the terms of trade, so that only the supply channel
is at work in the transmission of the oil price shock. A positive oil price shock
lowers τFLP and rotates the AS schedule downwards, from AS0 to AS1, because
of the substitution of labor for oil, and also shifts the AD schedule downward,
from AD0 to AD1, as the price level P increases. In the new equilibrium the
level of employment L does not change, consumption decreases from C0 to C1
and the price level increases from P0 to P1. The eﬀect of oil price shocks to the
Foreign economy is perfectly symmetric to that of the Home economy.
143.1.2 Nominal Price Rigidities
Nominal price rigidities are introduced by assuming that prices are predeter-
mined one period ahead.9 With nominal rigidities oil price shocks have asym-
metric eﬀects across countries, and the distinction between pricing regimes (PCP
or LCP) changes the propagation mechanism of oil shocks to the economy.
The PCP regime With nominal rigidities and PCP regime the exchange rate
in equilibrium is an increasing function of the price of oil (??), the exchange
rate elasticity to the price of oil is positive (??) and is an increasing function
of the price of oil (??). It follows that if a given positive oil price shock forces
the oil importing currency to depreciate by δ, an oil shock twice as large will
force a depreciation in the oil importing currency larger than 2δ. This result is
in accordance with the empirical results shown in Figure 3 where the response









∂Pe > 0 (11)





∂(Pe,t) > 0 (13)
The eﬀects of oil price shocks on the other variables in the economy are
reported below in terms of elasticities to the price of oil and expressed as a




χε,Pe < 0 , χPt,Pe,t =
1
2





χε,Pe > 0 , χP∗
t ,Pe,t = −
1
2
χεt,Pe,t < 0 (15)
χLt,Pe,t =
ϕPCP
t (Pe,t)  
ϕPCP
t (Pe,t) − 1
 χεt,Pe,t > 0 (16)
χL∗
t,Pe,t ≷ 0. (17)
Oil price shocks have asymmetric eﬀects to oil importing and oil exporting
countries as the change in the terms of trade redistributes asymmetrically across
countries the cost of adjustment to the shocks. After a positive oil price shock
the currency of the oil importing country depreciates to gain in competitiveness
and make up for the higher price of oil imports. The worsening in the terms
of trade of the oil importing country provokes a negative wealth eﬀect to which
9Quadratic costs of price adjustment à la Rotemberg or Calvo pricing would introduce a
more realistic dynamic of the economy but would not allow for an analytical solution.
15households react by both consuming less (11) and, even if real wages have been
driven down by a higher price level, supplying more labor services (11). House-
holds in the oil exporting country, instead, take advantage of the change in the
terms of trade, which makes imports cheaper and reduce the price level, and
increase their consumption.
The ﬁnal eﬀect on the production/employment is uncertain and depends on
the size of the oil price shock. By the supply channel, the increase in the price
of oil causes a replacement of labor for oil in the production function. However,
as the price of oil is exogenously ﬁxed in Home currency, the input price of oil
for Foreign depends also on χε,Pe. It follows that the larger the shock (and so
the larger χε,Pe ) the less important the supply channel in the Foreign coun-
try. Eventually, after a very large positive oil price shock the supply channel
might decreases employment in the Foreign country. Thus, the supply channel
increases foreign employment for small oil price shocks (elasticity) and decreases
it for large shock (elasticity). By the trade cahnnel, the foreign currency appre-
ciation both induces a worldwide replacement of oil importing for oil exporting
intermediates, which contracts the demand of labor in the oil exporting coun-
try, and also withers the increase in the price of oil as measured in oil exporting
currency, as the price of oil is denominated in home currency.
This is the terms of trade eﬀect of oil shocks on the oil exporting country
employment. The larger the size of the oil price shock, the bigger the probability
that the latter eﬀect will prevail and so that employment in the oil exporting
country will shrink after a positive oil price shocks.
Figure 5 shows the eﬀect of oil shocks to the oil importing economy using
the AS and AD schedules in the space (C,L) :
AS : Ct = τPCP
t Lt




As in the case of ﬂexible price, the terms τPCP
t in the AS schedule captures
both the supply and the trade channel of propagation of oil shocks. A positive
oil shock rotates inwards the AS schedule, from AS0 to AS1, while the increase
in the price level, from P0 to P1, shifts downwards the AD schedule, from AD0
to AD1. As a result consumption falls from C0 to C1 and the employment in-
creases from L0 to L1.
16 
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Figure 5 - The eﬀect of a positive oil price shock on the oil importing economy
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Figure 6 - The eﬀect of a positive oil price shock on the oil exporting economy
with nominal rigidities and PCP pricing.
17Figure 6 shows the impact of a positive oil price shock to the oil exporting
country with the aid of the AS and AD schedules. The AD schedule always shifts
upwards, from AD0 to AD1, as the price level always decreases from P0 to P1.
The AS schedule, instead, may rotate either upwards or downwards, depending
on which one between the supply and the terms of trade eﬀect prevails. For
small oil price shocks the supply eﬀect prevails and the AS curves will rotate
downwards, from AS0 to AS2, causing employment in the oil exporting country
to increase. For oil price shocks large enough the terms of trade eﬀect prevails
and the AS schedule rotates outwards, from A0 to A1, shrinking employment in
the oil exporting country.
The LCP regime With a LCP regime the strength of the trade channel of
adjustment to oil shocks gets reduced. The nominal exchange rate still reacts
to oil price shocks (11) but the elasticity of the nominal exchange rate to oil




















Under a LCP regime both economies are partially insulated from oil price shocks
as in both countries both the price level and consumption do not change after
an oil price shock (11). Oil price shocks only change the level of employment
(11) as the ratio of labor to oil in the production function reacts to the change
in the relative prices of the factors of production. However, the supply eﬀect is
always less severe in the oil exporting country (11) as the change in the price of
oil denominated in the oil exporting currency is moderated by the movement in
the nominal exchange rate.
χCt,Pe,t = χC∗
t ,Pe,t = χPt,Pe,t = χP∗
t ,Pe,t = 0 (21)
χLt,Pe,t = (1 − α) (22)
χL∗
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Figure 7 - The eﬀect of a positive oil price shock on the oil importing economy
with nominal rigidities and LCP pricing.
AS : Ct = ϕLCP
t Lt




Figure 7 shows the eﬀect of a positive oil price shock on the Home economy
with the help of the AS and AD schedules. After a positive oil price shock the
AD schedule stays put at AD0. The AS schedule, instead, rotates inwards as
labor replaces oil in the production function. The only change in the economy
of the positive oil price shock is the increase in the level of employment L. The
eﬀect of a positive oil price shock on the oil exporting country is almost identical,
the only diﬀerence being a reduced increase in the employment level L∗.
4 Discussion and Extensions
The model discloses two aspects of the trade channel of propagation of oil shocks,
speciﬁcally the role of the exchange rate pass-through and the non linear rela-
tionship between the size of oil shocks and the response of the economy. These
contributions help to better understand when oil price shocks may have a large
recessive impact on oil importing country, and suggest that a change in the ex-
change rate pass-through might contribute to explain the evidence of a weaker
impact of oil price shocks on the economic activity in recent times.
19The clarity of these messages comes from the closed form solution of the
model, which is obtained thorugh many simplifying assumptions. Thus, the
model represents a valuable starting point for an analysis of the relationship
between oil and macreoconomic performance which aims to fully reconcile data
with theory. In particular, the model should be extended in three directions:
endogenise the price of oil by introducing a world oil market, a more complex
structure of the international ﬁnancial market, and the introduction of capital.
The introduction of an international oil market would permit the model to
distinguish the eﬀects of oil price shocks according to the source of the shock.
A more complex modelling of international ﬁnancial markets would matter not
only because it aﬀects the strength of the trade channel but also because of the
so-called evaluation eﬀect (though it might play a minor role for oil importing
country under the assumption that the assets weightings in a country’s Port-
folio reﬂected the relative economic importance of the country). Finally, the
introduction of capital would allow for a more realistic and interesting dynamic
of the adjustment process of the economy to oil shocks.
20References
[1] Atkenson, A.J. and Kehoe, P.J. (1999), "Models of Energy Use: Putty-
Putty versus Putty-Clay", American Economic Review 89, 1028-1043.
[2] Backus, D.K. and M.J. Crucini (2000), "Oil Prices and the terms of Trade",
Journal of International Economics 50, 185-213.
[3] Balke, N.S., Brown, S.P.A. and M.K. Yucel (2002), "Oil Price Shocks and
the U.S. Economy: Where Does the Asymmetry Originate?," The Energy
Journal 23(3), 27-52.
[4] Barsky, R.B. and L. Kilian (2004), "Oil and the Macroeconomy Since the
1970," Journal of Economic Perspective 18, 115-134.
[5] Bernanke, B.S. (1983), "Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Invest-
ment," Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 85-106.
[6] Bernanke, Ben S., M. Gertler, and M. Watson (1997), “Systematic Mone-
tary Policy and the Eﬀects of Oil Price Shocks,” BPEA 1, 91—142.
[7] Blanchard, O.J., and J. Galì (2007), " The Macroeconomic Eﬀects of Oil
Price Shocks: Why are the 1970s so diﬀerent from the 2000s?", NBER
Working Papers 13368.
[8] Bodenstein, M., C.J. Erceg, and L. Guerrieri (2007), "Oil Shocks and Ex-
ternal Adjustments," mimeo, Federal Reserve Board.
[9] Bohi, D.R. (1991), "Energy Price Shocks and Macroeconomic perfor-
mance", Resource and Energy 13(2),145-162.
[10] Bresnahan, T. and V. Ramey (1993), "Segments Shifts and Capacity Uti-
lization in the U.S. Automobile Industry, " American Economy Review
Papers and Proceedings 83, 213-218.
[11] Bruno, M.R., and J. Sachs (1985), "Economics of Worldwide Stagﬂation",
Harvard University Press.
[12] Corsetti, G. and P. Pesenti (2005) "The Simple Geometry of Transmission
and Stabilization in Closed and Open Economies", NBER Working Paper
11341.
[13] Davis, S.J. (1987), "Allocative Disturbances and Speciﬁc Capital in Real
Business Cycle Theories," American Economic Review Papers and Pro-
ceedings 77, 326-332.
[14] Davis, S.J. and J. Haltiwanger (2001), "Sectoral Job Creation and Distruc-
tion Responses to Oil Price Changes," Journal of Monetary Economics 48,
465-512.
21[15] Devereux, M.B. and A. Sutherland (2010), "Valuation eﬀects and the dy-
namics of net external assets," Journal of International Economics 80(1),
129-143.
[16] Dohner, R.S. (1981), "Energy Prices, Economic Activity and Inﬂation: sur-
vey of issues and results " in K.A. Mork (Ed.): Energy Prices, Inﬂation and
Economic Activity. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
[17] Finn,M.G. (2000), "Perfect Competition and the Eﬀects of Energy Price
Increases on Economic Activity", Journal of Money Credit and Banking
32, 400-416.
[18] Fogli, A. and F. Perri. (2006), "The Great Moderation and the US External
Imbalance," Monetary and Economic Studies 24(S1), 209-225.
[19] Ghironi, G, J. Lee and A. Rebucci (2007), "The Valuation Channel of
External Adjustment," NBER Working Papers 12937.
[20] Gourinchas, P.O. and H. Rey (2007), "International Financial Adjust-
ment," Journal of Political Economy 115(4), 665-703.
[21] Hamilton, J.D. (1983), "Oil and the Macroeconomy since World War II,"
Journal of Political Economy 91, 228-248.
[22] Hamilton, J.D. (1988), " A Neoclassical Model of Unemployment and the
Business cycle", Journal of Political Economy 96, 593-618.
[23] Hamilton, J. (1996), “This Is What Happened to the Oil-Macroeconomy
Relationship”, Journal of Monetary Economics 38 (2), 215-220.
[24] Hamilton, J.D. (2003), "What is an Oil Shock," Journal of Econometrics
113, 363-398.
[25] Hamilton, J.D. (2008), " Oil and the Macroeconomy", in S.Durlauf and L.
Blume (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed., Palgrave
MacMillan Ltd.
[26] Hamilton, J. D. and A. M. Herrera (2004), “Oil Shocks and Aggregate
Macroeconomic Behavior: The Role of Monetary Policy: A Comment,”
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 36 (2), 265—86.
[27] Hooker, M. (1996), "What Happened to the oil price-macroeconomy rela-
tionship?", Journal of Monetary Economics 38, 195-213.
[28] Hooker, M.A. (2002), “Are Oil Shocks Inﬂationary? Asymmetric and Non-
linear Speciﬁcations Versus Changes in Regime,” Journal of Money, Credit,
and Banking34, 540-561.
[29] Kilian, L. (2008), "The economic eﬀects of Energy Price Shocks", Journal
of Economic Literature 46(4),871-909.
22[30] Kilian, L., A. Rebucci and N. Spatafora (2009), "Oil Shocks and External
Balances", Journal of International Economics 77, 181-194.
[31] Kilian, L. and R. Vigfusson (2009), "Are the Responses of the US Econ-
omy Asymmetric in Energy Price Increases and Decreases," International
Finance Discussion Papers.
[32] Kilian, L. (2009), "Not All Oil Price Shocks Are Alike: Disentagling De-
mand and Supply Shocks in the Crude Oil Market," American Economic
Review 99(3), 1053-1069.
[33] Kilian, L. and C. Park (2009), " The Impact of Oil Price Shocks on the
U.S. Stock Market", International Economic Review 50(4), 1267-1287.
[34] Koop, G. and M.H. Pesaran and S.M. Potter (1996), "Impulse Response
Analysis in Nonlinear Multivariate Models", Journal of Econometrics 74,
119-147.
[35] Lane,P.R: and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti, (2005) "A Global Perspective on Ex-
ternal Positions," NBER Working Papers 11589.
[36] Leduc, S. and K. Sill (2004), “A Quantitative Analysis of Oil Price Shocks,
Systematic Monetary Policy and Downturns,” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 51, 781-808.
[37] Lee, K. and S. Ni (2002), "On the Dynamics Eﬀects of Oil Price Shocks,"
Journal of Monetary Economics 49, 823-852.
[38] Lee, K., S. Ni and R.A. Ratti (1995), “Oil Shocks and the Macroeconomy:
The Role of Price Variability,” Energy Journal 16, 39-56.
[39] Loungani, P., and M.K. Yucel (2000), "How Robust is the Oil-
unemployment nexus?", mimeo.
[40] Mork, K.A. (1989), “Oil and the Macroeconomy. When Prices Go Up and
Down: An Extension of Hamilton’s Results,” Journal of Political Economy
97, 740-744.
[41] Mendoza, E., Quadrini, V. and Rios-Rull J.V. (2007), "Financial Inte-
gration, Financial Development and Global Imbalances", NBER Working
Papers 12909.
[42] Nordhaus, W. (2007), "Who’s Afraid of a Big Bad Oil Shock," Brooking
Papers on Economic Activity 2007-2, 219-238.
[43] Oystein, O., and H. T. Misen (1994), "Macroeconomic Responses to Oil
Price Increases and Decreases in seven OECD Countries", Energy Jour-
nal15 (4), 19-35.
[44] Rigobon, R and T.M. Stoker(2009) "Bias From Censored Regressors," Jour-
nal of Business & Economic Statistics 27(3), 340-353.
23APPENDIX A - General equilibrium conditions
Households The world consists of two countries of equal size, Home and
Foreign, which are identical in any respect apart from total factor productivity,
monetary policy and oil endowment. Oil is a Foreign speciﬁc resource, so that
Home is the oil importing economy and Foreign is the oil exporting economy.
Each country is inhabited by a continuum of households and ﬁrms: in the Home
country households are indexed by i ∈ [0,1] and ﬁrms are indexed by h ∈ [0,1];
in the Foreign country households are indexed by i∗ ∈ [0,1] and ﬁrms are indexed
by f ∈ [0,1]. I follow the convention of labelling with an asterisk the variables
of the foreign country and, when reporting results in a table, reporting results
for the Home country in the ﬁrst column and results for the Foreign country in
the second column.
In each country households share preferences, own domestic ﬁrms, derive utility
from a ﬁnal consumption good (Ct or C∗
t ) and disutility from supplying labor
services (Lt or L∗
t) to ﬁrms in exchange for wage income (Wt or W∗
t ). The
utility of home household i at a given period t is given by:
Ut(i) = lnCt(i) − kLt(i).
The parameter k > 0 determines the disutility of supplying labor and Ct is
produced in a perfectly competitive ﬁnal good sector by a Cobb Douglas aggre-
gator technology that combines a Home (CH,t) and a Foreign basket of goods








The ﬁnal consumption good cannot be traded and is entirely consumed. CH,t(i) and CF,t(i) are



























the parameter θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties, is equal
across countries and is higher than the elasticity of substitution between CH
and CF that is 1.
Symmetrically, for the foreign household i∗ we have:
U∗
t (i∗) = lnC∗















































, household’s demands for
(CH,t(i), CF,t(i)) in the Home country and household’s demands for C∗
H,t(i∗), C∗
F,t(i∗)

























The ﬁrst order conditions of each cost minimization problem give the demands
for the baskets of Home and Foreign goods, and the lagrangian multiplier associ-
ated to the technology constraint gives the price index of the ﬁnal consumption
good, which is then interpreted as the minimum expenditure required to con-
sume one unit of the ﬁnal good. The following table reports Home (column 1)
and Foreign (column 2) demands for the baskets of Home (A.2a, A.2b) and For-
eign goods (A.1a, A.1b), the prices of the ﬁnal consumption good (A.3a, A.3b)



























































Home and Foreign households’ demands for varieties h and f (Ct(h,i), Ct (f,i) and C∗
t (h,i∗), C∗
t (f,i∗))
























































































































































At any period t the home household i face the following one-period budget
constraint:
PtCt(i) + Bt(i) + εtB∗




where PtCt(i) is nominal spending on the ﬁnal consumption good, Wt is the
nominal wage per unit of labor, Πt(i) is household’s share of proﬁt of ﬁrms in
the intermediate goods sector. Households can purchase two riskless one-period
bonds at any period t: Bt(i), which is denominated in home currency and yields
a nominal interest it at t + 1, and B∗
t(i), which is denominated in foreign-
currency and yields a nominal interest rate i∗
t at t + 1. The nominal exchange
rate, εt, expresses how many units of Home currency are exchanged per one unit




t (i∗) + 1
εtBt(i∗) + B∗









In both countries households’ decision on consumption, labor supply and ﬁnan-
cial accumulation maximize the present discounted value of utility subject to


















t (i∗)) − κ∗L∗
t(i∗)
s.t. (A.7a) s.t. (A.7b)

































































26From (A.10a), it follows that Ct(i) = Ct as κ,Pt and Wt are common to all home
households. Similarly, by (A.10b) C∗
t (i) = C∗
t . Qt,t+1 (A.11a) is the nominal
discount rate of home households, and Q∗
t,t+1 (A.9b) is the nominal discount
rate of foreign households.
Intermediate goods sector In each country the intermediate goods sector
is characterised by monopolistic competition: any ﬁrm supplies a single variety,
h in the Home country and f in the Foreign country, that is an imperfect
substitute to all other varieties. Technology is represented by a Cobb Douglas
production function and is common across all ﬁrms in the same country:
Yt(h) = ZtE1−α
t (h)Lα
t (h) (A.12a) Y ∗






Zt > 0 (Z∗
t > 0) is the total factor productivity and is common across Home
(Foreign) ﬁrms. α ∈ (0,1) is the share of labor income and is common across
ﬁrms and countries. Lt(h) and Et(h) (L∗
t(f) and E∗
t (f)) are, respectively, the
amount of labor and oil that are employed in the production of variety h (f) at
the period t. The aggregate demand for a given variety, h or f, at time t is
given by aggregating Home and Foreign households’ demands for that variety








































































and demand the quantity of labor services (Lt(h) or L∗
t(f))
and oil (Et(h) or E∗
t (f)) that solve the following cost minimization problem
subject to the technology constraint:
Min
E(h),L(h)






t (f) + W∗
t L∗
t(f)
s.t.Yt(h) = ZtE1−α(h)Lα(h) s.t.Y ∗






From the ﬁrst order conditions we obtain the optimal ratio of factor inputs that
is adopted by the Home (A.13a) and Foreign (A.13b) intermediate goods ﬁrm,
while the lagrangian multiplier associated to the technology constraint provides






















t (f) = MC∗






27Any ﬁrm has to set two prices for the variety it produces, one in the Home
market and the other in the Foreign market. These two prices are set by the
ﬁrm to maximize its own proﬁt function, which is Πt(h) for home ﬁrms and
Π∗











t (h,i∗)di∗ − WtLt(h) − Pe,tEt(h)








































where the second part of the right hand side of A.(14a) follows from applying
(A.12a), (A.12c) and (A.13a), and the second part of the right hand side of
(A.14b) results from applying (A.12b), (A.12d) and (A.13b).
Monetary Policy In each country the monetary policy stance determines the
aggregate nominal spending by setting a parameter,  t in the Home country
and  ∗
t in the Foreign country. This speciﬁcation allows the monetary authority
to inﬂuence the aggregate nominal spending without having to specify the exact
instrument that monetary policy uses for it.




The price of oil The nominal price of oil is exogenous 10 and is denominated
in the oil importing country currency. Moreover, for the price of oil it always






Symmetric Equilibrium Conditions In a symmetric equilibrium the fol-





t , Pt(f) = PF,t, Pt(h) = PH,t, P∗
t (f) =,P∗
F,t, P∗
t (h) = P∗
H,t, Ct(f,i) =
CF,t, Ct(h,i) = CH,t, C∗
t (f,i∗) = C∗
F,t, C∗
t (h,i∗) = C∗




10Though an oil market is not explicitly modelled, the assumption of an exogenus price of
oil amounts to considering a perfectly elastic oil supply (any quantity of oil demanded can
be supplied at the given price) and zero marginal costs. The price of oil is then determined
entirely by a speciﬁc tax that is set up by the government of the Foreign country, and whose
revenus are redistributed across households as a lump sum transfer.
28Clearing Market Conditions Clearing market conditions for the labor mar-




































































General condition for the equilibrium nominal exchange rate A gen-
eral condition for the equilibrium nominal exchange rate, which is independent
of the pricing regime, is found by aggregating over Home households’ budget
constraint:





t(i)di + (1 + it−1)εt
 




















− WtLt(h) − Pe,tEt(h)
 
dh
= PH,tCH,t + εtP∗
H,tC∗
H,t − WtLt − Pe,tEt. (A.18)
Let’s impose ﬁnancial autarky as the equilibrium ﬁnancial allocations. To do
this (a) consider that both Bt and B∗











(b) assume the following ﬁnancial allocations: Bt = 0, εtB∗
t = 0, ∀t. The
aggregate budget constraint then becomes: PtCt − WtLt − Πt = 0. Replace in




This expression states that the nominal exchange rate moves to oﬀset imbalances
in the trade balance. By replacing in it (A.2a), (A.2b), (A.4a), (A 4b), (A.10a), (A.13a),
(A.15a), (A 15b), and (A.17a) I ﬁnd a general condition for the exchange rate




















 t − 1
 
. (A.19)
29To ﬁnd the equilibrium of the model the last conditions that are required are
the equilibrium prices of the intermediated goods. These prices are computed
under three diﬀerent scenarios, each one characterised either by ﬂexible prices or
nominal price rigidities, and by the speciﬁc pricing regime that the intermediate
goods ﬁrms adopt in the two countries. To deﬁne what are the possible pricing
regimes that a ﬁrm can adopt let us consider that in general the Home ﬁrm




where the parameter φ ∈ [0,1] is the degree of exchange rate pass-through. If
φ = 1 we are under the producer currency pricing (PCP) regime: the price the
ﬁrm sets in the Foreign market is ˜ Pt(h) = P∗
t (h)εt and is set in Home currency,
so that any change in the nominal exchange rate fully transmits to ˜ Pt(h). If
φ = 0 we are under the local currency pricing (LCP) regime: the price the ﬁrm
sets in the Foreign market is ˜ Pt(h) = P∗
t (h) and is set in Foreign currency,
so that no change in the nominal exchange rate aﬀects ˜ Pt(h). These two price
regimes can also be interpreted in term of the geographical distribution of the
ﬁrm’s production sites. Let us consider again the case of an Home ﬁrm that
produces h and let us assume that it always sets the price in the producer
currency, but now it can choose how to distribute its production between the
two countries. It follows that the inﬂuence of the exchange rate regime on the
price set in the Foreign market will depend on how the total production of h
is distributed between Home and Foreign. Full exchange pass-through would
correspond to the case in which h is entirely produced at Home, while the case
of no exchange pass-through would occur when the production of h has been
divided across the two countries as to serve both markets as a local ﬁrm.
The general condition to compute the Aggregate Supply (AS) of the oil im-






















Similarly, the general condition to compute the AS of the oil exporting coun-
























30APPENDIX B - The symmetric equilibrium in a
Flexible Price Regime
In a ﬂexible price regime the choice of the invoice currency for sales abroad does
not aﬀect the equilibrium prices of the intermediate goods, which are obtained
by solving the following proﬁt maximization problems:













































































Given the intermediate goods prices, we can use the conditions previously de-
rived in appendix A to compute the equilibrium of the two-country economy.
The equilibrium nominal exchange rate is found by replacing (B.1a) and (B.1b)
in (A.19) :
εt = ϕFLP  t
 ∗








The parameter ϕFLP captures the asymmetries in the equilibrium that are
caused by the distinction between an oil importing and oil exporting country.
The presence of ϕFLP causes the currency of the oil importing country to de-
preciate in equilibrium with respect to the case of no oil in the economy (as
in Corsetti and Pesenti). ϕFLP is an increasing function of both the degree of
monopolistic power in the Home intermediate goods sector (θ) and its share of
oil costs (1 − α). It approaches 1 as both (1 − α) goes to 0 (no oil is required
to produce) and θ approaches 1, as a larger monopolistic power implies both
a lower equilibrium production, which requires fewer oil imports, and larger
revenues from exports.
The equilibrium value of consumption is found by applying (A.1a), (A.2a), (A.4a),




















t is obtained from applying (A.1b), (A.2b), (A.4b), (A.15b),
























Equilibrium employment in the oil importing country is obtained by replacing
(B.3) in (A.19), and in the oil exporting country by substituting (A.4b), (A.13b),
(A.15b) in (A.17b) :

















To get Et, the quantity of oil used in equilibrium in the oil importing country,
replace (B.5a) in (A.13a), and similarly for E∗




















The equilibrium price level of each country is found replacing the equilib-
rium consumption level, (B.4a) for Ct and (B.4b) for C∗
t , in the correspond-
ing monetary policy stance equation, (A.15a) for the oil importing country
and (A.15b) for the oil exporting country:






























The ratio of foreign to home consumption in equilibrium is easily computed
from (B.4a) and (B.4b) :
C∗
t
Ct = ϕFLP > 1 ⇒ C∗
t > Ct.






ϕFLP < 1 ⇒ L∗
t > Lt.
Finally, the AS in the ﬂexible price regime is obtained by applying (B.1a), (B.1b),
(B.2a), (B.2b), (B.4a) and (B.4b) to(A.20a) :





























t in the AS schedule captures both the supply channel (the
condition of intratemporal marginal substitution between labor and energy) and
the trade channel of transmission of oil price shocks. However, with identical
technology across countries and no change in the nominal exchange rate, oil
price shocks do not change the terms of trade, so that only the supply channel
is at work in the transmission of oil price shocks.
32The eﬀect of price shocks to the oil importing and oil
exporting economy in a Flexible Price Regime
To understand the eﬀects of oil price shocks to the economy I compute the
elasticity of any variable of interest to the nominal price of oil. In particular,




Yt , that is the percent change in Yt as the price of oil rises
by one percent.
Proposition 1 In a ﬂexible price regime the nominal exchange rate is unaf-
fected by oil price shocks.
Proof. To prove it, it is suﬃcient to show χεt,Pe,t = 0, which follows immedi-
ately from (B.3).
Proposition 2 In a ﬂexible price regime, oil price shocks decrease the aggregate
consumption in both the home importing and the oil exporting country.
Proof. To prove it, it is suﬃcient to compute the elasticity of Ct and C∗
t to
Pe,t. From (B.4a) and (B.4b) I obtain χCt,Pe,t = χC∗
t ,Pe,t = −(1 − α) < 0.
Proposition 3 In any price regime, χCt,Pe,t = −χPt,Pe,t and χC∗
t ,Pe,t = −χP∗
t ,Pe,t.






















Pt = −χPt,Pe,t. Similarly, it is possible to compute χC∗
t ,Pe,t = −χP∗
t ,Pe,t.
By Proposition 3 it follows that with ﬂexible prices oil price shocks increase
the price level in both country as χPt,Pe,t = χP ∗
t ,Pe,t = (1 − α).
33APPENDIX C - The symmetric equilibrium
with Nominal Price rigidities and PCP Regime
Nominal price rigidities are introduced in the intermediate sector as ﬁrms set
the prices one period ahead. Under the producer currency pricing (PCP) the
ﬁrms ﬁx their prices in the producer currency, and the equilibrium prices solve
















































Replacing (A.4a, A.11a, A.15a and A.15b) in the ﬁrst order conditions of the
Home proﬁt maximization problem and replacing (A.4b, A.9b, A.15a and A.15b)
in the of the Foreign proﬁt maximization problem we obtain:
PH,t = θ

































  . (C.2b)






























  > 0.
As it makes little economic sense to have a negative nominal exchange rate,


















  = 1




















≤ 0, which amounts to set the fol-
lowing weak restrictions on the joint distribution of the exogenous variables
(Zt, ∗
t, t) : (i) Zt is uncorrelated to both monetary policies and (ii)  ∗
t is not
perfectly positively correlated with  t.







≤ 0 then k1 ≥ k0.




























































  = k1.
To ﬁnd the equilibrium value of consumption in the home oil importing coun-



































Similarly, to get the equilibrium value of consumption in the oil exporting coun-








































Equilibrium employment in the oil importing country is obtained by replacing
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
, (C.5a)






























  + 1
 
. (C.5b)
To get Et, the quantity of oil used in equilibrium in the oil importing country,
replace (C.5a) in (A.13a), and similarly for E∗



















































































35The equilibrium price level of each country is found replacing the equilib-
rium consumption level, (C.4a) for Ct and (C.4b) for C∗
t , in the correspond-
ing monetary policy stance equation, (A.15a) for the oil importing country




























































Finally, with nominal rigidities and under PCP prices the AS of the oil importing
country is obtained by applying (C.1a), (C.1b), (C.2a), (C.2b), (C.4a) and
(C.4b) to(A.20a) :
ASPCP : Ct = τPCP









































































































































Computing the eﬀect of oil price shocks to the oil
importing and oil exporting economy
Proposition 5 In presence of nominal price rigidities and under a PCP Regime
a positive (negative) oil price shock depreciates (appreciates) the currency of the
oil importing country
Proof. To prove it, it is suﬃcient to show that the elasticity of εt to the price
of oil is positive. From (C.3), χεt,Pe,t = (1 − α)MCt
k0+k1
(1−k1MCt)(1+k0MCt) > 0.
Proposition 6 In presence of nominal price rigidities and under a PCP Regime
the impact of an oil price shock to the economy increases more than proportion-
ally to the size of the shock.
36Proof. To prove it, it is suﬃcient to show that χεt,Pe,t increases with the size














Proposition 7 In presence of nominal price rigidities and under a PCP Regime
a positive (negative) oil price shock reduces (increases) the aggregate consump-
tion in the oil importing country.
Proof. To prove it, it is suﬃcient to show that the elasticity of consumption of
the oil importing country to the price of oil is negative, that is,
given Ct = kCε
−1
2


















































Proposition 8 In presence of nominal price rigidities and under a PCP Regime
a positive (negative) oil price shock increases (decreases) the aggregate consump-
tion in the oil exporting country.
Proof. To prove it, it is suﬃcient to show that the elasticity of consumption to




























































Proposition 9 In presence of nominal price rigidities and under a PCP Regime
after a positive (negative) oil price shock employment in the oil importing coun-
try increases (decreases) more than proportionally to the depreciation (appreci-
ation) of the nominal exchange rate.
Proof. To prove it, it is suﬃcient to show that the elasticity of the oil im-
porting country employment to the price of oil is positive and larger than the
elasticity of the nominal exchange rate to the price of oil. From (C.5a) it fol-




































t −1) > 1
Proposition 10 In presence of nominal price rigidities and under a PCP Regime
the larger the size of a positive oil price shock the bigger the probability that
employment in the oil exporting country will shrink.
37Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that the elasticity of foreign employment to
the price of oil is positive for oil price shocks of small size but turns neg-











































  < (1 − α). By proposition 6 χεt,Pe,t increases in the mag-
nitude of the shocks and so the larger the size of the oil price shock the more
likely that L∗
t will decrease.
The economic intuition behind Proposition 10 comes from considering that oil
price shocks aﬀect oil exporting country employment through a supply and a

















L is a combination of terms independent of Pe,t. The supply channel
of oil price shocks on L∗
t passes through P
1−α
e,t . As the production function is a
Cobb Douglas, the elasticity of substitution of labor for oil is 1, so that after a
positive oil price shock ﬁrms replace labor for oil. However, as the price of oil is
exogenously ﬁxed in Home currency, P∗
e,t depends also on εt, that is the trade
channel contrasts the supply channel. To see let’s compute the elasticity of the


















t εt = (1 − χεt,Pe,t).
It follows that for suﬃciently small positive oil price shocks the supply chan-
nel increases foreign employment, while for large shocks it decreases it. How-
ever, the trade channel aﬀects foreign employment also via a wealth and a
substitution eﬀect on the aggregate demand for foreign intermediate goods  
YF,t = CF,t + C∗
F,t
 
. By the wealth eﬀect home households feel poorer, con-
sume less and so lower the demand for foreign intermediate goods (CF,t), as
opposed to foreign households who feel richer, consume more and so increase





. By the substitution eﬀect
both Home and Foreign ﬁrms in the ﬁnal good sector switch their demand
for inputs from foreign to home produced intermediate goods. The ﬁnal eﬀect
of the trade channel on the aggregate demand for foreign intermediate goods
(YF,t) depends on the speciﬁc functional forms of preferences and technology.
Within the model, the trade channel shrinks (YF,t) for small shocks, while its
impact on (YF,t) is ambiguous for large shocks. To prove it let’s compute the








CF > 0, where K∗
CF is a combination of terms








































Similarly, from (A.1a), (C.1a) and (C.2b) we obtain : CF,t = ε
−1
2
t KCFCt, KCF >

























Thus, the trade channel always reduces the oil importing country demand for
oil exporting intermediate goods, while it reduces the oil exporting country
demand for oil exporting intermediate goods only suﬃciently small shocks (as
∂χεt,Pe,t
∂Pe,t > 0 and χC∗
F,t,Pe,t < 0 for χεt,Pe,t > 1). The ﬁnal eﬀect of oil price


























39APPENDIX D - The symmetric equilibrium
with Nominal Price rigidities and LCP Regime
Nominal price rigidities are introduced in the intermediate sector as ﬁrms
set the prices one period ahead. Under the local currency pricing (LCP) ﬁrms
in the intermediate goods sector ﬁx the price in the export market in the export

















































Replacing (A.4a, A.11a, A.15a and A.15b) in the ﬁrst order conditions of the
Home proﬁt maximization problem and replacing (A.4b, A.9b, A.15a and A.15b)
in the of the Foreign proﬁt maximization problem we obtain:
Pt(h) = PH,t = θ
θ−1Et−1 [MCt] (D.1a) P∗
















t (f) = P∗
F,t = θ
θ−1Et−1 [MC∗















  . (D.2b)











θ (1 − α)
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To ﬁnd the equilibrium value of consumption in the home oil importing country






























Similarly, to get the equilibrium value of consumption in the oil exporting coun-






























Equilibrium employment in the oil importing country is obtained by replacing


















































To get Et, the quantity of oil used in equilibrium in the oil importing country,
replace (C.5a) in (A.13a), and similarly to get E∗























































The equilibrium price level of each country is found replacing the equilib-
rium consumption level, (D.4a) for Ct and (D.4b) for C∗
t , in the correspond-
ing monetary policy stance equation, (A.15a) for the oil importing country









































Finally, with nominal rigidities and under LCP prices the AS of the oil importing
country is obtained by applying (D.1a), (D.1b),(D.2a), (D.2b), (D.4a)and (D.4b)to(A.20a) :




























































































41Computing the eﬀect of oil price shocks to the oil
importing and oil exporting economy
Proposition 11 In presence of nominal price rigidities and under a LCP Regime
a positive (negative) oil price shock depreciates (appreciates) the currency of the
oil importing country.
Proof. To prove it, it is suﬃcient to show that the elasticity of the nominal
exchange rate to the price of oil is greater than zero. From D.3,






























Proposition 12 In presence of nominal price rigidities and under a LCP Regime
in both the oil importing and oil exporting country oil price shocks aﬀect neither
the consumption nor the price level
Proof. To prove it, let’s compute the elasticity of Ct and C∗
t to the price of oil.
From (D.4a) and (D.4b), χCt,Pe,t = χC∗
t ,Pe,t = 0. By proposition 3 it follows
that χPt,Pe,t = −χCt,Pe,t = 0 and χP∗
t ,Pe,t = −χC∗
t ,Pe,t = 0.
Proposition 13 In presence of nominal price rigidities and under a LCP Regime
a positive (negative) oil price shock increases (decreases) employment in the oil
importing country.
Proof. To prove it, let’s compute the elasticity of Lt to the price of oil. From
(D.5a). χLt,Pe,t = ∂Lt
∂Pe,t
Pe,t
Lt = (1 − α) Lt
PE,t
Pe,t
Lt = (1 − α).
Proposition 14 In presence of nominal price rigidities and under a LCP Regime
after a positive (negative) oil price shock employment in the oil exporting country
increases (decreases), but by less than the increase in the oil importing country.

























(1 − α) = χLt,Pe,t.
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